The Right of the Line: The Role of the RAF in WW by John Terraine

Author:John Terraine [Terraine, John]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Pen and Sword
Published: 2010-04-05T21:00:00+00:00

Several things may be noticed; first, the factual, professional tone of the narrative, which adds to, rather than detracts from the drama of the episode; secondly, the great care not to make an unsubstantiated claim – owing, probably, a good deal to the methods of Peyton-Ward, but normal in Coastal Command. This contrasts very sharply with the “numbers game” of other Commands often referred to above, but the very different circumstances have to be taken into account: there is an enormous difference between attacking such an elusive enemy as a U-boat, whose chief asset is invisibility, and a free-for-all fighter battle in the air. Finally, we must note that the records show no U-boat sunk or missing on the day of F/612’s attack, which indicates very clearly how robust they were; the great strength which enabled them to withstand the pressures of the ocean depths enabled them also to survive what looks like certain death at the hands of their enemies. This, also, was a problem which Coastal Command had to overcome. In this particular case, however, it seems a reasonable assumption that the U-boat would have had to break off its patrol and make for home and immediate repairs.

Such gallant work notwithstanding, Whitleys were not the answer to Joubert’s problems, and the acquisition of another squadron (No, 58, from Bomber Command; Whitleys with ASV II) did little to ease his lot. His position, in fact, was rapidly becoming impossible, as he told the Air Ministry on March 30. He was, in the words of the AHB Narrative, being “metaphorically kicked by the Admiralty for not asking enough and blamed by the Air Ministry for demanding impossibilities’”. The Air Council blandly replied that “occasions on which an AOC-in-C’s views were at variance with Air Staff opinion were not abnormal and should not give rise to embarrassment in the case of Coastal Command”.23 As a sop, he received (on loan from Bomber Command) two more Whitley squadrons and two Wellington squadrons, while two Beaufort squadrons which had gone overseas were replaced by Hampdens.

Mention of Hampdens serves as a reminder of another area where Coastal Command’s affairs were not prospering. In the last quarter of 1941, its anti-shipping strikes had succeeded in sinking 15 enemy vessels for the loss of 46 aircraft. The first four months of 1942, however, saw a depressing decline of effectiveness: only six ships sunk, at a cost of 55 aircraft. There was a brief improvement in May, when the Command claimed 12 ships sunk; 10 of these claims were subsequendy confirmed, but the loss was high – 43 aircraft. The success was fleeting, the loss continuous; by June it was estimated that, during the last three months, one in four of all attacking aircraft had been lost. The war diary of No. 407 Squadron, RCAF (Hudsons), fills in the picture:

Since this squadron became operational again on 1st April we have lost twelve crews, in all fifty persons either missing or killed. During the past month six crews have been designated missing or killed on operations with the loss of twenty-seven lives.

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